This paper uses a unique dataset to examine the neglected but important issue concerning the relationship between the human capital and fund characteristics of venture capitalists and post-investment follow-up behavior in early stage high tech investments. We found no indication that involvement in monitoring activities by the investment manager is determined by either fund or human capital characteristics. In relation to value-adding activities, human capital variables were the most important, with previous consulting experience and entrepreneurial experience contributing to a higher involvement in valueadding activities. Furthermore, the diversity of an investment manager's portfolio was negatively related to involvement in value-adding activities. Finally, with respect to fund level characteristics, we found that investment managers of captive funds were less involved in value-adding activities.
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Introduction
Increasing concern about the performance of early stage high tech firms has focused on their ability to access to two key resources, finance and human capital expertise. In principle, venture capital (VC) firms can provide both but there are major questions about the extent to which this occurs [1] . This concern is particularly prevalent in Europe where there has traditionally been more emphasis on later stage investments Researchers have mainly considered the venture industry as a whole. Yet, both the skills of VC funds and the needs of investee companies are heterogeneous. The early stage high tech sector raises particular issues since these firms need relationships with VCs to access human capital and financial resources that will help them to meet the challenge of realizing new opportunities. Not all VC firms may be capable of providing these specific resources [1] . Thus, entrepreneurs need to be aware of the differences within the early stage high tech VC industry to identify the right investor for their needs.
This paper aims to fill the important gap in the literature concerning understanding of the determinants of the differences in post-investment follow-up behavior by VCs. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of European early stage high tech investors, the paper examines the extent to which human capital and fund characteristics are determinants of follow-up behavior. A distinction is made between monitoring and value adding activities. Monitoring performance is carried out to address information asymmetries and agency conflicts, whereas value-adding activities are aimed at improving investment outcomes. Differences in human capital and fund characteristics may influence the extent and effectiveness of these activities.
The paper unfolds along the following lines. We begin with an outline of the theoretical background of the study and formulation of the hypotheses. Second, we discuss the methodology used. Third, we present the results. The paper ends with a discussion of the conclusions and policy recommendations.
Conceptual Framework
This section provides an overview of the conceptual issues relating to the nature and intensity of VC involvement and how this is influenced by human capital and fund characteristics. to follow-up activities and how it can be explained.
The nature and extent of venture capitalist involvement
To explore these questions further, we consider two factors that differentiate between VCs: first the human capital of the investment manager and second, the characteristics of their funds. We subsequently explore the nature of these factors and their possible relation with follow-up behavior. We build on self-efficacy theory to explain how the human capital of investment managers may influence their follow-up behavior. Self-efficacy theory suggests that people who think they can perform well at a task do better than those who think they will fail [32] . Thus, people perform activities and pick social environments they judge themselves capable of managing [33] . More experience in a certain task will increase self-efficacy in that task. This contributes to the development of a strong sense of efficacy through mastery experience. In the context of this study, self-efficacy theory posits that individuals with greater experience achieve higher performance in executing pre-and post-investment activities. In an early stage high technology venture capital context, we argue that experience will relate to experience of specific industry sectors.
Human capital and venture capital involvement
That is, an investment manager who focuses on a more narrow range of industries will have greater experience of those industries than an investment manager who has a more diversified portfolio. This is because experience is often more relevant to the individual when it occurs in similar circumstances [33] . In addition, specialization at the investment management level may lead to information and networking advantages through the development of social capital. Second, portfolio theory suggests that having a portfolio of investments minimizes risk while maximizing the overall portfolio return. In constructing an investment portfolio, VCs can follow two strategies. Traditional finance theory argues that portfolio diversification reduces total portfolio risk. The resource-based view (RBV), however calls for portfolio specialization to minimize the risk of individual investments [37, 38] . From the RBV perspective, investors should specialize by constructing a portfolio of investments that are within their specific technical and product expertise [37] .
Fund characteristics and venture capital involvement
Given the complexities of technologies, it is critical that the professional investor is highly informed on both technical and commercially related issues [39] . Thus, some VCs manage risk by specializing in certain technology areas rather than by diversification across several technologies. Thus, the degree of specialization at the fund level impacts involvement in following up behavior.
The model and hypotheses
Drawing on the theoretical perspectives elaborated above, this section formulates hypotheses for VC involvement in both monitoring and value-adding activities. The conceptual framework behind the hypotheses is summarized in Figure 1 .
<<insert figure 1 here>>
Involvement in Monitoring Activities
VCs tend to spend little time monitoring well-performing investments, but may be highly involved in monitoring those that are poorly performing [7] . Monitoring activities may not be related to the human capital and financial characteristics of the VC firm.
Monitoring may be necessary to avoid losses but not sufficient to create value added. As 
Involvement in value-adding activities
As explained above, self-efficacy theory [33] suggests that individuals with more successful previous experience will be more involved in post-investment value-adding activities. Dimov and Shepherd [14] differentiate between the specific and general experience embodied in the human capital of the investment manager. They define education and experience in business, law and consulting as specific to the pre-and postinvestment value adding activities of VCs, while education in humanities and science, along with entrepreneurial experience is categorized as general. Furthermore, we argue that it is also important to focus on the investment manager's specific experience in relation to the industry sectors in which he/she is investing. The more specialized the portfolio, the more likely it is that the investment manager will have developed specific human capital in relation to his / her investments. Conversely, the more diversified the investments in the portfolio, the less likely it is that the investment manager will have developed specific human capital in relation to his / her investments.
The degree of specific human capital will be positively related to the chance of obtaining mastery experiences and thus the degree of self-efficacy. This will lead to a higher involvement in value-adding activities that require specific expertise. Similarly, general human capital, especially entrepreneurial experience, may enable the VC manager to assist the entrepreneur by drawing on the experience of the steps required to successful negotiate the hurdles along the development trajectory. Therefore:
H2a: Involvement in value-adding activities is positively related to specific human capital H2b: Involvement in value-adding activities is positively related to general human capital Fund characteristics and policy may also impact the follow up behavior of investment managers. Strategic investment theory suggests that fund shareholders' different expectations concerning fund performance may affect involvement in valueadding activities. Specifically, fund objectives may differ between captive (i.e. private equity arms of banks or public funds) and non-captive funds. As non-captive funds have a higher profit-orientation [37] and have incentive systems based on profit generation, they are more likely to be closely involved in value adding activities to achieve their rate of return targets. Hence:
H2c: Involvement in value-adding activities is negatively related to captive funds
Traditional finance theory suggests that funds should deal with risk through diversification. In contrast, the RBV suggests that specialist VCs might cumulate specific skills and resources and obtain a competitive advantage. As is the case at the level of the individual investment manager, information and networking advantages are likely to occur when VCs specialize as they are able to deepen their knowledge of particular markets [37] . This may result in information and network advantages between investment managers working at the same fund, enabling them to be more involved in value-adding activities. Hence:
H2d: Involvement in value-adding activities is negatively related to the degree of diversification at fund level.
Research methodology
The sample A stratified sample of 68 VC firms was drawn from different regions across and MacMillan et al [12] resulted in five monitoring activities, and 14 value-adding activities. The pilot interviews identified three additional value-adding activities, all of which were specific to high tech investing: "negotiating intellectual property rights", "recruiting the head of R&D" and "forming the Advisory Board". The resultant 22
follow-up activities are presented in Table 1. <<Insert Table 1 here>> Investment managers were asked to score these follow-up activities on two scales:
frequency and importance. The frequency of each activity was scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1= never carry out this activity to 5= always carry out this activity for portfolio companies. The importance attached to the activities was scored on a scale ranging from 1=little important follow-up activity to 5= very important follow-up activity. Multiplying both scores resulted in 'involvement indicators' for each of the 22
follow-up activities, with scores ranging between 1 and 25, with 1 being low involvement for the follow-up activity and 25 being very high involvement.
Individuals were asked to explain and justify their responses in order that we could understand the context of the VC industry, at the time of interview, better. This part of the interview took about half an hour per respondent.
Measures

Dependent variables
Involvement in monitoring and value-adding activities
We combined the indicators for each of the five monitoring activities and the 17 valueadding activities into summated scales. To check consistency, we used Cronbach's Alpha. All summated scales met the 0.60 value for acceptability [45] 5 . One issue in assessing Cronbach's Alpha is that increasing the number of items increases the reliability value. Therefore, Cronbach's Alpha is higher for value-adding activities compared to monitoring ones, even though they are both acceptable (Hair et al, 1998 ).
All assumptions necessary to carry out explorative factor analysis were met, with values in the anti-image correlation matrix being close to zero, the Bartlett test of sphericity rejecting the null hypothesis of no correlation between variables (pvalue<.001) and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure larger than .50. A component analysis model was used. Communalities of variables were all above the .50 limit, with .568 being the lowest communality for a variable. Factors were interpreted using VARIMAX factor rotation, summarizing the sum of variances of required loadings of the factor matrix.
Exploratory factor analysis revealed that none of the monitoring activities loaded on value-adding activities and vice versa, allowing us to use the initial subdivision of activities in monitoring and value adding. Summated scores were retained in the analysis as the relatively small sample meant that the relatively high factor loadings (larger than
.70) required to use factor scores were not met. Factor analysis however revealed similar types of follow-up activities identified by previous research, namely strategic roles, networking roles, operational roles and interpersonal roles. Monitoring activities loaded on a different factor. Board membership loaded only on the strategic factor, indicating that our sample regarded this mainly as strategic rather than a monitoring function. This was supported by the interviews, where investment managers mentioned that it was more efficient to monitor a portfolio company by regularly telephoning the entrepreneur rather than spending time at board meetings. Table 2 presents descriptives for each follow-up activity.
<<insert Table 2 about here>> Table 2 shows that early stage high tech investors seem to be the least involved in operational roles and networking activities. They tend to be more involved in monitoring activities, strategic activities and interpersonal roles.
Independent variables
Human capital
A number of measures based on their previous experience were used to identify VC executives' human capital. The investment managers interviewed had either worked at a bank, consulting firm, in industry, in academia, or had been entrepreneurs before joining the VC industry. Consulting experience, financial experience, business experience and investment management experience were, consistent with Dimov and Shepherd [14], labeled 'specific human capital'.
We asked for the number of years worked at a bank, audit or accountancy firm before joining the VC industry, and coded this as the degree of financial experience.
Years worked as a consultant was coded as consulting experience. Years experience in a management function in industry was coded as business experience.
People from the financial world had on average worked for 6.6 years in either a bank, audit firm or as accountant. Investment managers who worked in consulting before joining the VC industry had on average 3.9 years experience in consulting. Investment managers with a previous career as manager in a company had on average eight years of experience. The investment managers in our sample had on average 4.85 years of experience as a VC investment manager, with a range from 1 to 17 years.
A further specific dimension of specific human capital is whether the investment executives manage diversified or specialized portfolios of companies with respect to industry focus. To construct this measure, the EVCA industry classification was used, identifying eight high tech sectors. 6 This results in a score of 1 to 8 for each investment manager, 1 being the most specialized and 8 the most diversified.
Both academic and entrepreneurial experience was considered as general human capital [14] . If the investment managers had obtained a PhD, we labelled this academic experience (1=academic experience, 0=no academic experience). If they had been entrepreneurs themselves, we coded this as having entrepreneurial experience (1=entrepreneurial experience, 0= no entrepreneurial experience). Seven investment managers had academic experience, ten had been entrepreneurs.
Fund characteristics
Fund characteristics were measured by two variables. First, funds that were 100% publicly funded or that were private equity arms from banks were classified as "captive funds", others were not (1=captive; 0=not captive). 15 of our sample of 68 were 6 Communications, computer related, other electronics related, biotech, medical/health related, energy, chemicals and materials, industrial automation classified as "captive funds", including six private equity arms from banks and nine public funds.
We measured the degree of specialization at fund level using the same EVCA industry classification mentioned above. This resulted in each fund being assigned a score from 1 to 8.
Control variables
We employ control variables in respect of VC fund location and size. [47]. Therefore, two dummy variables were created, one indicating whether the fund was located in the UK or not (0=non-UK, 1=UK), and one indicating whether the fund was located in Scandinavia or not (0=non-Scandinavia, 1=Scandinavia).
Second, we controlled for the size of the fund, measured as the capital managed, which previous research has found to influence VC firm behavior (see Elango et al [48] ).
Results
The correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table   3 .
<<insert Table 3 here>> All variance inflation factors were below 3.0, suggesting that multicollinearity was not an issue [45] . Hypotheses were tested using regression analysis. We conducted several diagnostic tests to ensure the data did not violate the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Using Z scores and a visual inspection of histograms, we found all dependent variables to be normally distributed. Residuals were tested for independence, normality and constant variance. All necessary conditions were met.
Involvement in monitoring activities (H1)
The model is not statistically significant for monitoring activities (Table 4) .
Neither human capital variables nor fund characteristics seem to be important determinants of the degree of investment manager involvement in monitoring activities.
Therefore, we find support for H1, that monitoring is not affected by human capital or fund level characteristics.
<<insert Table 4 here>> A higher level of consulting experience indicates a higher involvement in value-adding activities. Investment managers that had been entrepreneurs were more involved in follow-up activities than others. Investment managers that specialize in one or a small number of sectors are more involved in these value-adding activities. The only fund level characteristic which was found to be statistically significant was captive funds, which was negatively related to involvement in value adding activities.
Involvement in value-adding activities (H2)
<<insert Table 5 here>> In summary, we find partial support for H2a: consulting experience has a significant positive effect on value-adding involvement. Furthermore, the more specialized the portfolio of an investment manager the greater the involvement in valueadding activities. Financial experience and the other specific human capital variables were not found to have a significant impact. We find partial support for H2b, that general human capital is positively related to value-adding activities. In particular, entrepreneurial experience has a significant positive effect on value-adding involvement but academic experience has a non-significant effect. We find support for H2c, captive funds are less involved in value-adding activities. Finally, we do not find support for H2d, therefore, the degree of diversification of a fund has no significant impact on valueadding involvement.
Conclusions
Using a unique, hand collected dataset, this study has examined neglected aspects We found that both human capital characteristics (hypotheses H2a and H2b) and fund characteristics (hypotheses H2c) determine the VC's involvement in value-adding follow-up activities. Concerning human capital characteristics, specific human capital in terms of consulting and general human capital in terms of entrepreneurial experience were related to value adding activities. Besides, specialization by the investment manager with respect to industry focus was found to positively impact value-adding involvement.
These findings are consistent with the self-efficacy aspects of human capital which suggest that more experience in performing certain relevant tasks will enable actors to perform more effectively. The significance of the consulting variable suggests that investment managers with this experience will be more able to add value to high tech ventures by both identifying markets and helping ventures achieve competitive advantage in those markets. General human capital relating to entrepreneurial experience may be important as the self-efficacy gained from undertaking previous entrepreneurial ventures may help new venture entrepreneurs to negotiate the hurdles involved in successfully commercializing their ventures. Further, we found that the degree of diversification at investment management level has a negative impact on involvement in value adding activities. This is expected since it is difficult for investment managers to keep track of strategic information and build a network in different sectors and industries.
Concerning fund characteristics, we found a difference between captive funds and others (H2c). Investment managers at captive funds were less involved in value-adding managers to develop activities. This is especially surprising for public funds since they typically invest in seed stage ventures with high risk and uncertainty, incomplete teams of entrepreneurs, and far from market-ready technology. Since these portfolio companies 
Policy and Management Implications
The findings have interesting implications for investment managers, entrepreneurs and policy makers.
Our study shows that the degree to which a deal is monitored and the kind of activities. This is surprising since one would expect an even larger involvement in these earlier stages.
Even within funds, our findings provide more fine-grained analysis than previous research with respect to human capital [1] by indicating that investment managers as individuals differ in the way they deal with the portfolio companies they manage.
Investment managers with human capital relating to a consulting background tend to be most intensively involved in following up their deals from a value-adding point of view.
Besides, if they specia lize in a limited number of sectors, they are more involved in value-adding activities. Additionally, investment managers with a background as entrepreneurs tend to be more involved with value-adding activities. This implies that the investment manager's prior experience determines to a large extent his/her management 7 Additional tests on our sample show that public funds are smaller (average capital managed 83.8 million Euro compared to 297.8 million Euro for non-public funds; difference significant at P<.10), construct diversified portfolios and have less investment managers per sector managed (.80 compared to 3.09 for non-public funds; difference significant at P<.01), and that investment managers at public funds manage more investments at a time than their non-public counterparts (9.40 investments per investment manager compared to 4.09 for non-public funds; difference significant at P<. 05) style once he/she enters into the VC world 8 . This observation has important implications for the recruitment policy of VC companies and is an interesting signal to entrepreneurs who look for "smart" money.
If an entrepreneurial team is confident that it does not require advice or detailed value adding assistance from a VC investor, it may seek to be funded by a public or captive fund. Alternatively, where it does need advice, it may better to seek investment with an independent, specialist VC firm.
Our results also have important policy implications. Government attempts to bridge the equity gap for high tech start-ups and academic spin-outs in particular have involved the setting up public-private partnership funds. The private partners in these funds are usually captive private equity arms of large financial institutions who are often asked to manage the fund. These financial institutions have the slack capacity to invest in government relations and the geographical coverage to set up different public/private partnerships in a particular country. The drawback, as our evidence shows, is that these funds typically engage less in value adding activities.
This study points to several interesting questions for future research. An interesting extension would be to interview more than one investment manager per fund in order to determine whether the importance of fund characteristics still hold when looking at the entire group of investment individuals involved in a VC fund. It would also be interesting to investigate whether involvement in value-adding activities has a positive impact on portfolio company performance. This would then contribute to the recent debate of whether venture capital is an art of building winners or picking them [52] .
Finally, linking involvement in monitoring activities to performance of the portfolio companies followed up by the investment manager could shed light on our view that the degree of monitoring will be linked to portfolio company performance. Levels of significance: *=.10; **=.05; ***=.01; ****=.001; n=63 
